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Meat Your Enemy: Animal Rights, Alignment and Radical Change 
 
Abstract 
Radical change can be conceived in terms of the reconceiving of ontological distinctions, 
such as those separating humans from animals. In building on insights from French 
pragmatism, we suggest that, whilst no doubt very difficult, radical change can potentially be 
achieved by creating ‘alignment’ between multiple ‘economies of worth’ or ‘common 
worlds’ (e.g., the market world of money, the industrial world of efficiency). Using recent 
campaigns by animal rights organizations as our case, we show how the design of ‘tests’ 
(e.g., tests of profitability, tests of efficiency) can help align multiple common worlds in 
support for radical change. Our analysis contributes to the broader management and 
organization studies literatures by conceiving radical change in terms of changing ontological 
categorizations (e.g., human/animals vs. sentient/non-sentient); and by proposing that radical 
social change agents can be helpfully conceived as opportunistically using events to 
cumulatively justify the change they desire overtime. 
 
Key-words: Alignment, Animal Rights, Common Worlds, Economies of Worth, Social 
Change.  
 
Acknowledgements: 
We would like to thank our editor, Saku Mantere, and the JMI anonymous reviewers, for 
their very helpful comments throughout the submission process. We also thank Céline 
Berrier-Lucas, Ben Cashore, Franck Cochoy, Verena Girschik and Jeremy Moon for their 
helpful comments on prior versions of this manuscript. Part of this project was completed 
whilst Glen was a Marie-Curie Intra-European Fellowship at CBS. Glen kindly acknowledges 
the financial support he received from the European Union during this time. 
  
3 
 
Meat Your Enemy: Animal Rights, Alignment and Radical Change 
It has recently been lamented that, despite being a key goal of many individuals and 
organizations, social change, and the moral and political understandings important thereto, 
remains largely ignored by management and organization scholars (Cloutier and Langley, 
2013; Lawrence et al., 2013: 1029; Martí and Fernández, 2013). Accordingly, and given 
recurrent calls for recognizing French pragmatist sociology as a relevant ‘lens’ for 
organizational analysis in its own right (Diaz-Bone, 2009; Brandle et al., 2014; Gond, 
Cloutier & Leca, 2015a: 200), we seek to redress this lacuna by extending insights from 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) ‘economies of worth’ framework. Most generally, we 
propose that rather than being limited to raising conflicts or seeking compromise between 
common worlds, as Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) suggest, organizations (and networks  or 
individuals) that aim at radical change can also seek the ‘alignment’ of common worlds. 
Different common worlds are characterized by different values and principles, different 
notions of (un)worthiness, different types of tests and phenomenal evidence, and by different 
sets of agents and subjects (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 216-346). The market, industrial 
and civic common worlds for instance, respectively measure success in terms of money, 
efficiency and social welfare, and respectively include such key actors as customers, 
engineers and citizens. Whilst common worlds are different, the presumption that they are 
“largely incompatible” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 216; see also Boltanski, 2011: 28; 
Stark, 2011) has resulted in a general failure to recognize that, in addition to common worlds 
potentially being brought into relations of conflict and compromise, they can also potentially 
be brought into relationships of ‘alignment’.  Alignment emerges when different common 
worlds agree, or are “provoked” (Boxenbaum, 2014: 321-322) to agree by those with the 
requisite “competences” (Pernkopf-Konhäuser, 2014), that a given set of empirical 
developments is desirable in their own, unambiguous, terms. 
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When a film is a commercial success and the subject of critical acclaim for example – 
such as Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather, which cost $6 million to make and grossed 
over $101 million within eighteen weeks of its 1972 release, and which also received three 
academy awards (Horne, 2009) – it brings the market and inspired common worlds into 
alignment. When, on the other hand, a film is only a commercial success, such as the 2009 
release Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (Sciretta, 2009); or only a critical success, such 
as the 1982 release Blade Runner (Keaton, 2013), then it does not bring the market and 
inspired worlds into alignment. As these simple examples illustrate, and further to their being 
different from both conflictual and compromised relations, relationships of alignment also 
differ from the monstrous or awkward common world “composite setups” that Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006: 225-228) lampoon. 
Key to our overall argument is the suggestion that, if a change is to be considered radical, 
then it needs to result in deeply or thoroughly habitualized (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977) practices 
and understandings undergoing some sort of ontological change or shift. Such shifts relate to 
transformations to what can be termed the “fiat boundaries” (Smith and Varzi, 2000: 403) 
that enable entire societies to make such distinctions as those between humans and animals 
(Latour, 2004) or humans and nature (Descola, 2013a). Historical examples of what we mean 
by radical change include the 16th century Valladolid controversy, in which Spanish 
Dominicans struggled with the rights of Indians in the colonies (Tierney, 1997: Chapter 11); 
the effective movement to abolish slavery in the 19th century (e.g., Ray, 1989); and the 
transformations brought about by women’s suffrage in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
(Gullace, 2014). More currently, we propose that the animal rights movement should be 
conceived as having a radical agenda: for in undermining distinctions between humans and 
animals it upsets “the constitution of individual and collective identity; at least in the Western 
world” (Descola, 2013b). 
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It is with the activities of animal rights organizations being used for illustrative purposes, 
then, that we here make four overlapping contributions to the organization and management 
literature on justification inspired by French Pragmatist Sociology, and to institutional 
understandings of radical change. First, we propose that aligning common worlds comprises a 
central yet thus far overlooked type of “justification work” (Jagd, 2011; Oldenhof et al., 
2013; Patriotta et al., 2011; Taupin, 2012) or “competence” (Dodier, 1993; Pernkopf-
Konhäuser, 2014). More specifically, we propose that a key reason for the aligning of 
common worlds being so important is that it enables radical agents to diminish their 
opponents’ capacity to use conflict or compromise between common worlds to maintain 
existing social policies and practices (Oldenhof et al., 2013; Taupin, 2012). 
Second, we shed light on how radical agents mobilize ‘tests’ and material developments 
(Boltanski, 2012; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Dansou and Langley, 2012) in what we 
conceive as their efforts to align common worlds in an opportunistic and cumulative manner. 
In doing so, however, we do not seek to prove that animal rights activists are consciously 
engaging in alignment work. Nor do we seek to show that such work has led, or will 
ultimately lead, to the radical transformation that animal rights activists’ desire. Rather, we 
more modestly propose that the activities of animal rights activists will often be helpfully 
conceived in terms of the ‘aligning’, rather than the ‘conflicting’ or ‘compromising’, of 
common worlds. 
Third, we advance the recent recognition that French pragmatic sociology can supplement 
existing perspectives on institutional pluralism and conflicts (e.g., Dansou & Langley, 2012; 
Patriotta et al., 2011). Most notably, we show how economies of worth can be mobilized as 
‘toolkits’ (Thornton et al., 2012: 9, 42) to undermine, and potentially construct, a given set of 
norms (e.g., those regarding the appropriate treatment of animals) that are supported by a 
plurality of value perspectives, and that thus saturate a given society. 
6 
 
Fourth, we advance a social, broad and deep conception of radical change that we believe 
more accurately represents general understandings of radical, and that differs from alternative 
and influential conceptions of radical that are more ‘narrowly’ focused on the 
field/professional level (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In doing so, we also suggest 
that, rather than conceiving the analysis of changing ontological categories as lying at the 
extremes or margins of institutional and organizational analysis (Martí and Fernández, 2013), 
such changes should be conceived as lying at its heart: for it is such distinctions and 
categories that underpin, and contribute to interactions between, otherwise diverse and 
different institutional and organizational outlooks.  
Regarding the paper’s structure, we use the next section to quickly introduce the pragmatic 
turn in French sociology. In particular, we note that Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) propose 
that common worlds can be related in conflict, composite setups, and compromises, and that 
such relations are often actualized through “justification work” (Patriotta et al., 2011) or 
“tests” (Dansou & Langley, 2012). We then propose that by increasingly aligning common 
worlds, radical social change agents strengthen their own position, and weaken that of their 
opponents by reducing the number of common worlds that can be used to inform direct 
conflicts or ambiguous compromises directed against them. 
So as to demonstrate the import of these theoretical developments, we then construct a 
case that shows how animal rights organizations can be helpfully conceived as having 
commonly sought to align their radical critique with the civic, industrial, fame and green 
common worlds. We also use this case to demonstrate that animal rights organizations can be 
helpfully conceived as using various opportunities to cumulatively justify the alignment of 
their radical critique with the green and industrial common worlds in particular. In 
concluding, we provide a discussion of our analysis and its limitations, and make some 
suggestions for future research. 
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FRENCH PRAGMATIC SOCIOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
To more fully realize the potential of French pragmatist sociology for organizational analysis 
(Brandle et al., 2014; Diaz-Bone, 2009; Gond et al., 2015a), and in recognizing the risks of 
“conceptual borrowing” and of “blending” with institutional analysis (Boxenbaum, 2014; 
Bullinger, 2014; Cloutier and Langley, 2013; Gond and Leca, 2012), we undertake two tasks 
in the present section. First, we distinguish French pragmatism from ‘critical sociology’. 
Second, we consider its implications for theorizing radical change.  
The French pragmatic ‘sociology of critique’ differs from the French tradition of ‘critical 
sociology’ (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977) in three ways of particular importance for the present paper 
(Boltanski, 2012). First, it resists the assumption that sociologists are significantly more 
capable than non-sociologists (e.g., managers, mothers and fathers) when it comes to 
understanding everyday life (Boltanski, 2011: 21; Latour, 2004: 225). Contra the likes of 
Bourdieu (e.g., 1977: 164-165, 1984: 471), then, the sociology of critique does not consider 
everyday actors to suffer from some sort of doxa that (necessarily) prevents them from 
understanding the shape and limitations of the habitus informing their conceptual and 
practical activities (Boltanski, 2012). Thus, the sociology of critique suggests that Bourdieu 
(1977: 168-169) overstates the point when he proposes that the dominated (e.g., the 
proletariat, workers under neoliberalism, females suffering patriarchy) generally lack the 
“material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition of the real that is imposed on them 
through logical structures reproducing… social structures”. 
Second, the sociology of critique has descriptively focused on “situations where people 
engage in critique – that is, disputes” (Boltanski, 2011: 24, emphasis in original). This has 
involved identifying, observing and documenting ‘critical moments’ such as public 
denunciations of scandals or complaints (Boltanski, 2012; Boltanski et al., 1984; Boltanski 
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and Thévenot, 1999). Critical sociologists, on the other hand, have tended to focus on those 
critiques that they themselves engage in (for example, Bourdieu, 1998). 
Third, and whereas critical sociologists emphasize that fields result in their participants 
sharing a more or less similar and generic habitus that limits and frames the forms of capital 
they value (Bourdieu, 1977), the sociology of critique has emphasized that actors are 
“competent” (Pernkopf-Konhäuser, 2014: 334-335) in that they can draw upon as many as 
eight ‘common worlds’– i.e. the market, industrial, civic, domestic, inspired, fame, green and 
network worlds – in an effort to critique or defend existing policies and practices in the 
context of public disputes (e.g., Gond, Barin-Cruz, Raufflet & Charron 2015b; Guggenheim 
and Potthast, 2012; Patriotta et al. 2011). These ‘common worlds’ enable the ‘same’ 
phenomena – e.g., a managerial decision making process – to be (de)valued or 
(de)legitimated in different ways. 
In presuming that common worlds are horizontally equivalent (i.e., no common world 
necessarily ‘trumps’ any other), and in presuming that they tend towards incompatibility 
(Boltanski, 2011: 28; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 216; Stark, 2011), French Pragmatic 
Sociology has also emphasized that common worlds can be related in terms of conflict, 
composite setups, or compromise. Relationships of conflict (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 
Chapter 7) involve discordance and disagreement, and are readily illustrated : e.g., the value 
the green common world places on environmental friendliness and future generations can 
easily be brought into conflict with the value the market world places on short-term financial 
gains (e.g., Gond et al., 2015b; Patriotta et al., 2011: 1810). 
When common worlds are related in terms of “composite setups”, on the other hand, they 
are less in conflict with each other than they are grouped in an “awkward” or “incongruous” 
fashion that results in the creation of such “monstrous hybrids” as the decision to “offer 
(domestic) a political tract (civic) as a gift to an employee”, or the decision “to allocate 
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(civic) bouquets (domestic) to one’s grandparents” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 226). 
Composite setups, then, are often marked by either a naivety regarding context, or by a hubris 
regarding one’s capacity to draw upon multiple common worlds to achieve one’s ends.  
Finally, French pragmatists have also suggested that common worlds can be melded 
together, rendered equivalent, and formed into a compromise, as when arguments from the 
domestic and market world are combined to propose that “a faithful friend is a solvent client” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 277). Importantly, such “an equivalence is treated as self-
evident; it is not made explicit. [For] In a compromise, the participants do not attempt to 
clarify the principle of their agreement…” (Ibid.). Furthermore, compromises effectively 
result in new common worlds being created: e.g., elements of the civic and industrial world 
can be used to construct a civic-industrial hybrid (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 285-292). 
Given the presumption that social arrangements are uncertain, that reality is fragile 
(Boltanski, 2011: 54), work in the French pragmatist tradition posits that a major task of 
“justification work” is to contribute to the maintenance of existing, or the construction of 
new, and constantly shifting, compromises (Patriotta et al., 2011; Taupin, 2012). Whilst it is 
(implicit) ambiguities that make such compromised relations possible in the first instance 
(Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; cf., Flyverbom, 2011: 81; Stark, 2009: 191-195), it is also 
what results in the possibility of their dissolution (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 278-281). 
Prominent recent examples of common world compromises are corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Blowfield, 2005), a market, industrial, civic and (shallow) green 
common world hybrid; and environmental management (e.g., Prasad & Elmes, 2005) and 
sustainable development (e.g., Banerjee, 2003), both of which are market, industrial and 
(shallow) green common world hybrids. All three of these common world compromises are 
the result of a melding of the actors, norms, tests, and so on, of the common worlds they 
respectively combine. CSR policies and practices, for example, commonly bring together 
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businesses concerned with profitability (from the market common world), non-governmental 
organizations concerned with human rights and social welfare (from the civic common 
world), non-governmental organizations concerned with sustainability and the environment 
(from the (shallow) green common world), and other organizations concerned with ensuring 
accountability and transparency (from the civic common world once again).  
Such compromises are also marked by the emergence of hybrid measures of success. 
Thus, the emergence of CSR is associated with a significant range of slightly different 
metrics that help to determine the relative (un)worthiness of different corporate actors (e.g., 
Déjean, Gond & Leca, 2004; Waddock, 2008).  In the terminology of French pragmatism, 
these metrics act as “reality” or “reformist” tests (Boltanski, 2011: 103): for they reinforce 
and develop the notion of the common good central to the CSR common world compromise. 
The ambiguity at the heart of common world compromises like CSR (Kamzi, Leca & 
Naccache, 2015), however, means that they can also be made the subject of “existential” or 
“radical” tests (Boltanski, 2011: 103) that ‘purely’ draw upon the common worlds they 
combine. Those that  identify with a (deep) green common world outlook (e.g., Naess, 1989), 
for example, can employ notions of worth that value the natural world in and of itself to 
conflictually undermine the common world compromises of CSR, environmental 
management or sustainable development: all of which only superficially engage with a green 
common world ethic (Prasad & Elmes, 2005). 
What the French pragmatism literature suggests, then, is that the beneficiaries of an 
existing social order will try to maintain it by creating compromises that meld multiple 
common worlds or normative agendas (e.g., financial, efficiency and social considerations), 
and that they simultaneously hope will reduce the number of common worlds that can be 
conflictually deployed against them (e.g., Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: Boltanski, 2011; 
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Blokker, 2011; Gond et al, 2015b; Patriotta et al., 2011). This basic recognition provides a 
starting point for the analysis of radical social change agendas. 
ALIGNING ORDERS OF WORTH FOR RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE 
Radical social change is here conceived as involving beliefs, values and conceptions that are 
both ‘deep’ and ‘wide’. In writing of phenomena being ‘deep’, we follow the ‘critical 
sociology’ literature more than the ‘sociology of critique’ literature, and refer to the fact that 
different beliefs, values and conceptions can be strongly habitualized (Bourdieu, 1977), and 
can remain more or less unquestioned by both the scholarly and non-scholarly communities. 
Prior to the Copernican revolution, beliefs regarding the earth’s centrality within the universe 
appear to have been very deep (e.g., Kuhn, 1996: Chapter 7). And in present day Western 
societies, beliefs regarding differences between (sentient) humans and (unthinking) matter are 
also very deep (e.g., Descola, 2013a). 
By writing of ‘wide’, on the other hand, we refer to the fact that different beliefs, values 
and conceptions can also be more or less popular. Christian fundamentalists within the United 
States, for example, have been very deeply opposed to the theory of evolution over the last 
thirty years (Miller, Scott & Okamoto, 2006). The fact, however, that 71% of adults aged 
under 30 in the United States now think that evolution is true, suggests that creationist beliefs 
are having an increasingly narrow influence (Gross, 2015). Beliefs regarding differences 
between (sentient) humans and (unthinking) matter, by way of contrast, appear to remain 
both ‘deep’ and ‘wide’: e.g., both Christian fundamentalists and the rest of Western society 
tend to unthinkingly presume that the internal experiential reality of human kind is superior to 
whatever experiences matter, nature, or animals, are presumed to have. 
This deep and basic assumption underpins the widespread practice of using animals as 
means for human ends: e.g., the use of beagles and cats in cosmetic and medical experiments; 
the eating of cows, pigs, ducks and fish; the skinning of animals to produce fur and leather; 
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the racing of greyhounds; the ‘petting’ and ‘zooing’ of animals. On the other hand, it is also 
why (most) humans find slavery, rape and murder (of humans) abhorrent. 
In trying to change such wide and deep conceptions – and the policies and practices that 
they inform (and that subsequently inform them) – animal rights activists face considerable 
difficulties. In everyday practice, this is revealed by the suggestion that the worst criminals 
dehumanize their (human) victims or treat them like animals (Martí and Fernández, 2013; cf. 
Patterson, 2002; Spiegel, 1996). Moreover, it is revealed by the manner in which children are 
taught to make important distinctions between animals and humans before they can clearly 
articulate them: e.g., they are taught that biting (into) dead animals and eating them is ok, but 
that biting, let alone eating, other (dead) humans, is not. As they get older, children are also 
taught, more formally and explicitly, that animal products are part of a healthy diet (e.g., the 
United States Department of Agriculture’s current ‘MyPlate’ initiative). 
As radical can be defined in different ways, we emphasize that our conception is broadly 
consistent with dictionary definitions of the term: e.g., as “thoroughgoing or extreme” change 
(dictionary.com). Moreover, we note that our definition resonates with Hache and Latour’s 
(2010: 313) suggestion that radical critics seek to make “an extension of the class of [morally 
valuable] beings”, and that it also resonates with the manner in which Boltanski (2011: 109) 
writes of existential change: e.g., of a woman who murders her son being transformed into a 
woman who commits euthanasia. On the other hand, we note that our conception of radical is 
more thoroughgoing than that advanced by institutional theorists, who have tended to write of 
radical with regard to relatively narrow transformations in such fields as the business service 
professions (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002).  
By definition, then, we conceive of radical change agents as confronting a popular force 
that perceives a strong interest in maintaining the status quo. More pointedly, and in addition 
to being able to create conflicts and compromises, we propose that radical activists can try to 
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align common worlds to achieve their ends. As noted in the preceding section, common 
worlds are brought into conflict when they are used to generate different value judgements 
about the same phenomena (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 218), and into compromise when 
clashes between them are suspended or overlooked to enable their compositional support of 
the same phenomena (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 277-288). By way of contrast, we 
propose that common worlds are brought into alignment when they simultaneously value the 
same phenomena in accord with their own, separate, internal logics. Moreover, and as table 1 
summarizes, we propose that the alignment of common worlds differs from the construction 
of composite setups on the basis of their being marked by unanimity between common 
worlds, and not their mismatch. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
Through aligning common worlds, radical agents can increasingly minimize the capacity 
for incumbent beneficiaries of a status quo to conflictually deploy specific common worlds 
against their critique on the one hand, and to (re)create complex common world compromises 
that help maintain the status quo on the other. This second capacity in particular, is of 
fundamental importance to the maintenance of extant policies, practices and normative values 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Accordingly, we suggest that there are good reasons for 
thinking that the activities of radical activists will often be helpfully conceived in terms of the 
alignment of common worlds, and in terms of their diminishing the ability of incumbent 
beneficiaries to ambiguously combine common worlds in variable compromises. 
Whilst it is possible to imagine a given task of alignment occurring instantaneously, the 
nature of radical change means that it will only ever be concretely realizable overtime. 
Indeed, we propose that, as the ‘weight of history’ favours reproduction of the status quo 
(e.g., the notion of path dependency), agents of radical change will often need to wait for, 
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seek out, or enable, material developments that change the results of common world ‘tests’ 
(Cloutier and Langley, 2013; Gond et al., 2015b). 
The Napoleonic Wars and the emergence of industrial capitalism, for example, provided 
material developments that diminished the worth of British colonial slave labour, relative to 
free wage labour, when subject to civic and market tests in the early nineteenth century 
(Davis, 1987). In a broadly similar fashion, the First World War made it easier for suffragists 
to demonstrate the equal worth of women (to men) through various civic and market tests in 
the early twentieth century (Gullace, 2014). 
Given such considerations, we propose that radical change agents can be helpfully 
conceived as seeking to align common worlds in an opportunistic and cumulative manner. In 
writing of an opportunistic element, we simply note that radical change agents can make use 
of events or world happenings that they have not designed (Hoffman & Occasio, 2001). For 
example, the Napoleonic Wars and First World War were not designed by abolitionists and 
suffragists respectively, but nevertheless provided them with opportunities by which to 
further their respective radical agendas. The cumulative element, on the other hand, refers to 
how radical change agents can use opportunities to successively build up a collection of tests 
within a given common world. The history of science, which shows that it is a critical mass 
of tests, rather than ‘one black swan’, that leads to the development of a paradigm changing 
scientific theory (Kuhn, 1996), points towards the importance of such accumulation. 
In light of such, we propose that agents of radical change similarly need to construct and 
undertake, a succession of “state of worth tests” (Dansou and Langley, 2012: 511-512) or 
“truth tests” (Boltanski, 2011: 106) within a given common world if they are to prove capable 
of aligning it with their radical agenda. Most simply, we suggest that one ‘state of worth’ test 
will in effect never result in a given set of deep and wide social practices being deemed 
illegitimate from the perspective of a given common world. 
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AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: ANIMAL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 
To illustrate that agents of radical change can be helpfully conceived as seeking to align 
common worlds in an opportunistic and cumulative manner, we now detail a case on animal 
rights organizations and their radical social change objective. Before doing so, we emphasize 
a number of methodological considerations that contextualize and help explain the case that 
follows. First, the case has contributed to, and is used to illustrate, the above described 
conceptual developments. This admittedly ‘circular’ role of evidence is generally consistent 
with abductive approaches to theorizing: for abductive conceptual developments are 
motivated by the need to explain empirical developments that extant conceptual 
developments struggle with (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007).  
Second, the evidence we have collected does not seek to prove that animal rights activists 
have or will successfully bring about the changes they desire, and does not aim to show that 
animal rights activists have hitherto conceived of what they are doing in terms of alignment. 
Rather, the evidence we have collected is meant to show that the activities of animal rights 
activists can be revealingly conceived in terms of alignment. This concern with concept 
illustration is widespread throughout management and organization studies (e.g., 
Schoeneborn, Blaschke and Kaufmann, 2012: 439-446). Moreover, it is entirely consistent 
with the ‘soft’ theoretical developments that one finds in French pragmatist writings (e.g., 
Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006): which are more concerned with conceptualization than they are 
with constructing ‘hard’, falsifiable, causal analyses (e.g., Eckstein, 1975).  
In gathering our data – and as is common in both discursive and historical research (e.g., 
Lawrence and Phillips, 2004; Prasad et al., 2014), and in work informed by French 
Pragmatist Sociology (e.g., Gond et al., 2015b; Patriotta et al., 2011; Ramirez, 2013) – we 
first collected archival data from various sources, including the websites of animal rights 
organizations. This enabled us to identify key events of particular significance to the present 
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analysis. With such events providing our focus, we were then able to collect additional 
archival data – e.g., newspaper reports, artefacts used in campaigns – to obtain more detailed 
empirical evidence about alignment work. 
Animal Rights Organizations as Radical Change Agents 
Animal rights organizations have a radical agenda. They seek to disrupt the deeply 
institutionalized (Western) distinction that is drawn between humans and (other) animals 
(Descola, 2013a, Latour, 2004), and propose that in most important ways, humans and 
animals are morally equivalent. In particular, they emphasize that just as humans have 
experiential realities (Regan, 2004) within which they can experience pain and pleasure 
(Singer, 1995), so too do animals.  
These core arguments for animal rights take various forms and are informed by various 
(and commonly opposed) philosophical traditions. Regan (2004) for example, adopts a 
broadly Kantian line when he argues that animals are “subjects of a life” that have inherent 
value and “rights”, whereas Singer adopts a utilitarian line in arguing that animals need to be 
“liberated” from pain and suffering (Singer, 1995). Despite the often considerable and, 
depending on the context, very important, philosophical differences between these and other 
arguments for animal rights – e.g., Adams’ (1990) feminist and critical perspective, or 
Patterson’s (2002) and Spiegel’s (1996) more anthropological and discursive arguments – 
what all such variously styled arguments have in common, is that they can be situated within 
what Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) conceive of as the civic common world. The reason why 
is that they all construct a community within which humans and animals have equal moral 
standing in fundamentally important regards. Thus, and just as humans cannot be killed or 
enslaved for food, clothing, or entertainment, actors for animal rights – such as People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and it’s affiliates, a non-government organization with 
more than 5 million members and supporters; and the “by any means necessary” Animal 
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Liberation Front (ALF) – generally emphasize “that animals are not ours to eat, wear, 
experiment on, or use for entertainment” (PETA, 2014a). 
In constructing this community, animal rights organizations such as PETA and 
Vegetarians’ International Voice for Animals (Viva!) act as ‘spokespeople’ (Callon, 1986; 
Latour, 2004: 64) for animals who cannot speak by themselves. Whilst this inability of 
animals to speak for themselves points towards an important distinction between (many) 
humans and animals in general, it should not be overstated (Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 
1981; Latour, 2004: 70). Indeed, it is commonplace for humans to speak for other humans 
that currently cannot, or will never have, the capacity to speak at all (e.g., those suffering 
from severe physical or mental disturbances). Nevertheless, we also recognize that 
spokespeople can betray those they claim to represent (Latour, 2004: 65). 
Whilst there can be overlap between what are referred to as the animal rights and animal 
welfare movements respectively, it is important to distinguish between them. As already 
indicated, the animal rights movement has a radical agenda: it is (categorically) opposed to 
the use of animals for human ends. This means that animal rights activists like ALF, PETA 
and Viva! are opposed to the consumption of meat, fish and dairy, the use of leather and 
wool, and are (generally) opposed to vivisection. The animal welfare movement, by way of 
contrast, has a reformative agenda: for it only seeks to ensure that animals are treated better 
or more ‘humanely’, and is non-abolitionist when it comes to animals being used as means 
for human ends (e.g., Marcus, 2005). The RSPCA (the Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals) is a classic example of an animal welfare organization, in that it only 
encourages people to be ‘kinder’ to animals (that will often get killed). Indeed, the RSPCA 
(2016) supports a range of ‘RSPCA Assured’ meat products (e.g., beef, chicken, veal), and 
lists McDonalds as one of its partners. Suffice it to note that PETA considers such an 
assurance scheme “meaningless as far as animal welfare goes” (PETA UK, 2016).  
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Further to the above noted tools of philosophical and theoretical reasoning that animal 
rights organizations deploy to morally justify the equality of humans and animals within the 
civic common world, animal rights organizations also commonly seek to align their radical 
agenda with at least three other common worlds: i.e. the industrial, fame and green worlds. In 
terms of the first of these worlds, we quickly note that animal rights organizations have 
continuously emphasized that the production and consumption of animals for food and 
clothing is inefficient. Most generally, animal rights organizations continuously emphasize 
that animal products are inefficient in terms of human health (e.g., by emphasizing links 
between animal products and heart disease) and resource usage (e.g., by emphasizing the 
purportedly huge levels of water consumption that are required to turn animals into food). 
The common world of fame, on the other hand, is often appealed to through the 
advertising, marketing, and public relations activities of animal rights organizations. PETA 
for example, are currently endorsed or supported by such celebrities as Paul McCartney of 
the Beatles, comic and TV host Ellen Degeneres, comic Ricky Gervais, actress Pamela 
Anderson, and actor Joaquin Phoenix. In arranging such endorsements, PETA act on the 
widespread belief that people wish to replicate the values and practices of celebrities they 
identify with (e.g., Basil 1996; Cashmore 2006; Fraser and Brown 2002). Nevertheless, we 
also note that PETA’s infamous use of female celebrities and (naked) ‘attractive’ women  - as 
per the Alfred Hitchcok inspired poster featuring Pamela Anderson in figure 1 below – has its 
critics (e.g., Papon, 2012).  
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
Finally, we highlight that animal rights organizations also commonly deploy tests and 
notions of (un)worthiness from the green common world to justify their objectives. As PETA 
(2014b) succinctly put it:   
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…raising animals for food damages the environment more than just about anything else 
that we do. Whether it’s… global warming, massive water or air pollution, or soil 
erosion, raising animals for food is wreaking havoc on the Earth. 
THE WORK OF ALIGNING COMMON WORLDS 
We now present some of the alignment activities that animal rights organizations have 
undertaken, focusing in particular on how they have mobilized material developments, 
artefacts and tests. As animal rights organizations are most clearly associated with the civic 
common world (and the philosophical arguments associated therewith), we outline some of 
the alignment work they have undertaken with regard to the industrial and green common 
worlds, two worlds they are less obviously associated with.  
Aligning Orders of Worth from the Industrial World 
According to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 204-205), the “ordering of the industrial world 
is based on the efficiency of beings, their performance, their productivity…  Waste, spoilage, 
rejects, pollution, deterioration… are all negative signs of worth…” As PETA’s ‘Feeding the 
Future’ (2011a) poster succinctly illustrates (see Figure 2), animal rights activists commonly 
propose that the production and consumption of animal products is grossly inefficient, and 
thus incompatible with ‘orders of worth’ in the industrial world. 
-- Insert Figure 2 about here -- 
Like Singer’s (1995) argument for “animal liberation”, contemporary arguments opposed 
to the inefficiencies of meat production are utilitarian in form. Furthermore, they are often 
traced back to the publication of Diet for a Small Planet by Frances Moore Lappé in 1971. In 
this work, Lappé castigated meat production for being wasteful and for contributing to food 
scarcity. Animal rights organizations continue to advance broadly similar arguments in an 
opportunistic and cumulative manner. Further to their ‘Feeding the Future’ poster, then, 
PETA (2014c) currently use their website to note that: 
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Raising animals for food is grossly inefficient, because while animals eat large 
quantities of grain, soybeans, oats, and corn, they only produce comparatively small 
amounts of meat, dairy products, or eggs in return. This is why more than 70 percent of 
the grain and cereals that we grow in… [the United States] are fed to farmed animals. 
In making such claims, PETA commonly reference both individuals and organizations that 
others would consider experts. Regarding the issue of water for example, they write that: 
Nearly half of all the water used in the United States goes to raising animals for food. 
In 2008, John Anthony Allan, a professor at King’s College London and the winner of 
the prestigious Stockholm Water Prize, urged people worldwide to go vegetarian 
because of the tremendous waste of water involved with eating animals. 
It takes more than 2,400 gallons of water to produce 1 pound of meat, while growing 1 
pound of wheat only requires 25 gallons. You save more water by not eating a pound of 
meat than you do by not showering for six months! (PETA, 2014c) 
And in referring to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization this time 
(Steinfeld et al., 2006), PETA employs a similar tactic by noting that: 
According to the United Nations, raising animals for food (including land used for 
grazing and land used to grow feed crops) now uses a staggering 30 percent of the 
Earth’s land mass. More than 260 million acres of U.S. forest have been cleared to 
create cropland to grow grain to feed farmed animals, and according to scientists at the 
Smithsonian Institution, the equivalent of seven football fields of land is bulldozed 
worldwide every minute to create more room for farmed animals. (PETA, 2014c)  
A less intuitive effort that PETA has made to align their agenda with the industrial order 
of worth involves their promotion of in vitro meat (PETA, 2014d), or shmeat (sheets of lab-
grown meat). Shmeat builds upon developments in tissue engineering, and has advanced 
rapidly since the turn of the century. Further to other actors, e.g. NASA, the Dutch 
Government (Macintyre, 2007), PETA has played a role in actively encouraging the 
development of shmeat through “the ongoing promotion of the technology; a $1 million prize 
to whoever first sells a significant quantity… in the United States; and its funding of a three-
year post-doc research post at an American university [the University of Missouri]” 
(Stephens, 2013: 175). Although PETA’s efforts to promote the commercialization of shmeat 
clearly involves market orders of worth, there is a general consensus that – as the 
commercialization of shmeat is still some time off (perhaps 20 years); and because the 
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scientists involved are less motivated by business than they are research – these specific 
efforts are best conceived as promoting science (Engber, 2008; Schwartz, 2008). 
Within this broader context, PETA’s founder Ingrid Newkirk (2013) has suggested that the 
5th of August 2013 will be remembered as a momentous day. The reason being that it was on 
this day that Professor Mark Post of the University of Masstricht first cooked, served to 
others, and himself ate, “the world's most expensive hamburger, made from meat grown in 
Petri dishes in his lab” (Jha, 2013a). The hamburger cost £250,000 pounds, was the 
culmination of five years of research, and provided a “proof of concept” (Jha, 2013b). 
This hamburger provides a fundamentally important “state of worth” (Dansou and 
Langley, 2012: 511-512) or “truth” (Boltanski, 2011: 106) test: for it demonstrates the 
material viability of in vitro meats. To borrow some famous words from Winston Churchill, it 
points towards humanity’s possible escape from “the absurdity of growing a whole chicken in 
order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these parts separately under a suitable medium” 
(Churchill, 1931, para. 12). 
Aligning orders of Worth from the Green World 
In 2006 the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) released a report 
entitled Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options (Steinfeld et al., 2006). 
As evidenced by their continuing reference to it, this report has proven a watershed moment 
for animal rights organizations (e.g. PETA, 2014e; Viva!, 2014). The report states that: 
The livestock sector emerges as one of the top two or three most significant 
contributors to the most serious environmental problems, at every scale from local to 
global…. it should be a major policy focus when dealing with problems of land 
degradation, climate change and air pollution, water shortage and water pollution and 
loss of biodiversity. (Steinfeld et al., 2006: xx) 
By clearly linking so many environmental concerns to the livestock sector, the FAO report 
proposes that the use of animals for human food is inconsistent with the environmental ‘mode 
of evaluation’ associated with the green common world (Thévenot et al., 2000). Whilst, all of 
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the environmental concerns raised by Livestock’s Long Shadow are important for the green 
common world, the report’s suggestion that the “livestock sector is …responsible for 18 
percent of greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions … a higher share than transport” (Steinfeld et 
al., 2006: xxi), has garnered the most attention and controversy (e.g., Fairlie, 2008).  
Although the FAO has subsequently revised their headline figure down to “14.5 percent of 
human-induced GHG emissions”, they continue to acknowledge that “the livestock sector 
plays an important role in climate change” (Gerber et al., 2013: xii). More broadly, a variety 
of studies suggest that greenhouse gas emissions would be significantly reduced by the 
widespread adoption of a vegan diet. Eshel and Martin (2006) for example, conclude that if a 
person eating the ‘mean US diet’ (comprised of meat, dairy and other food products) were to 
adopt a vegan diet, then they would reduce their GHG emissions by 6.2%. 
It is within this broader context that PETA has taken the opportunity of subjecting a 
number of prominent individuals and organizations that are purportedly committed to 
addressing climate change to “state of worth tests” (Dansou and Langley, 2012: 511-512) or 
“truth tests” (Boltanski, 2011: 106). Perhaps most notably, and following on from his 2006 
climate change ‘call to action’ film and book, An Inconvenient Truth, PETA has subjected 
former US Vice-President Al Gore to an on-going test of his Green credentials. 
The test began in 2007 when PETA proposed that Gore’s own inconvenient truth was that 
the quickest way by which to reduce GHG emissions was through diet change, and 
subsequently asked in a graphical and well publicised manner, whether or not Gore was ‘too 
chicken to go vegan?’ (see: Figure 3).  
-- Insert Figure 3 about here -- 
PETA subsequently deployed a “sexy mother earth” to a Gore book signing in 2009, and 
remonstrated that Gore’s “hypocritical addiction to meat is getting in the way of his call to go 
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green”. And following Gore’s (2011) critique of President Obama’s climate change policies, 
PETA’s Executive Vice President Tracy Reiman wrote a letter to Gore stating that: 
As you know, going vegan will help reduce animal suffering, your waistline, and your 
impact on the planet, so it’s a win-win situation for everyone… After all, it wouldn’t do 
to challenge the president’s ‘climate of denial’ while ignoring your own book’s 
excellent advice. (PETA, 2011b) 
Finally, PETA congratulated Gore on his recent decision to go vegan (Eilperin, 2013) 
when they wrote that: 
We knew it would happen. No one who cares about climate change as much as Al Gore 
does can continue to support one of the leading causes of the phenomenon: factory 
farming. His Live Earth benefit concerts promote going vegan, and now Al Gore 
himself has made the switch to a plant-based diet. (Kretzer, 2013)  
Importantly, PETA have long applied similar tests to other actors (e.g. PETA, 2008). Most 
recently, they have publicly endorsed the 2014 film Cowspiracy, which, much like 
Livestock’s Long Shadow, emphasizes that: 
Animal agriculture is the leading cause of deforestation, water consumption and 
pollution, is responsible for more greenhouse gases than the transportation industry, and 
is a primary driver of rainforest destruction, species extinction, habitat loss, topsoil 
erosion, ocean “dead zones,” and virtually every other environmental ill. Yet it goes on, 
almost entirely unchallenged. 
Furthermore, the film documents filmmaker Kip Andersen as he:  
…approaches leaders in the environmental movement… [and] increasingly uncovers 
what appears to be an intentional refusal to discuss the issue of animal agriculture…  
PETA’s endorsement of the film, in this last regard in particular, is loud and clear when 
they note that Andersen and the film producer, Keegan Kuhn, were entirely justified in their 
concern:  
…to know why the high-profile environmental groups that should be challenging the 
meat and dairy industries were essentially ignoring them… and put representatives 
from Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and other 
well-known environmental groups in the hot seat and ask… them. (Moore, 2014) 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article we have proposed that radical change is helpfully thought of in terms of 
ontological shifts and conceived the possibility of aligning common worlds. In doing so, we 
have clearly distinguished the work of alignment from the previously noted work of relating 
common worlds in terms of conflict, composite setups, or compromise. Furthermore, we have 
used the case of animal rights activism to show that the idea of aligning common worlds 
helps reveal new insights with regard to the task of radical change. In concluding, we discuss 
the paper’s more general importance for the management and organization studies literatures, 
identify a number of its limitations, and make some suggestions for future research. 
Aligning Common Worlds in an Opportunistic and Cumulative Fashion 
Hitherto, the French pragmatism literature has a priori emphasised the “incompatibility” 
(Boltanski, 2011: 28) or “insurmountable opposition” (Taupin, 2012: 533) of common 
worlds. For reasons detailed in the above case, we consider this presupposition overstated and 
unhelpful. In particular, it has tended to obscure the recognition of common worlds being 
aligned. 
Whilst the alignment of common worlds is harmonious in that a group of common worlds 
need to unanimously agree, in a fashion consistent with their own varying criteria and 
agendas, that a given set of (potential) empirical developments are of positive worth, such 
common world alignment is not necessarily peaceful. Indeed, the above described efforts that 
PETA and other animal rights activists have made in aligning common worlds are marked by 
controversy and disruption, and are both conflictual and sensational. Neither Al Gore nor the 
environmental non-governmental organization Greenpeace for example, invited animal rights 
activists to subject their own policies and practices to the sort of environmental tests that they 
commonly seek to impose on others.  
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On the other hand, the initial contesting of assumptions underpinning the FAO’s claim that 
the livestock industry was responsible for a massive 18% of global greenhouse emissions 
(e.g. Fairlie, 2008), highlights that whenever a test suggests that a common world should no 
longer support a status quo (e.g., the livestock industry), these tests will be perceived as 
controversial and disruptive. In light of such, it is unsurprising that those with a vested 
interest in various forms of animal exploitation will not simply accept that their activities are 
inconsistent with the technical efficiency mode of evaluation associated with the industrial 
common world. Thus, and at the same time that animal rights activists have sought to 
promote the efficiency of a vegan diet, shmeat, and so on, the livestock industry, and other 
interested parties, have proposed such things as ‘pig towers’, or what amounts to a more 
efficient method of intensive pig farming (Driessen, 2012). 
The point we are making is that, although the act of aligning common worlds seeks to 
avoid, or minimize the possibility, of conflict between common worlds, it nevertheless has to 
create conflict within each of the common worlds it seeks to align. Indeed, if radical activists, 
individuals or organizations did not have to identify or create evidence or tests designed to 
undermine or destabilize a common world’s support for a given status quo, then they would 
not be radical. Furthermore, we note that the act of aligning common worlds can also involve 
tactics that many would find repugnant. PETA’s 2003 campaign/exhibit, ‘Holocaust on Your 
Plate’, for example, juxtaposed pictures of (intensively) farmed animals with pictures of 
Holocaust victims, and proved very upsetting for some (Snaza, 2004). Moreover, PETA is 
routinely criticized for their highly sexualized/pornographic campaigns on the basis that they 
degrade women (and men) (e.g., Bindel, 2010). 
Whatever the instrumental merit of such shock tactics, our case has shown that PETA and 
other animal rights activists can be conceived as employing them, alongside other less 
controversial tactics, in a manner that align common worlds in an opportunistic and 
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cumulative manner. In terms of the Green common world, for example, our analysis has 
shown how the likes of PETA opportunistically made use of the UN FAO report in 2006, 
Livestock’s Long Shadow, to highlight the multitudinous ways in which the livestock sector is 
destroying the environment. Our analysis has also shown how PETA subsequently subjected 
Al Gore to an environmental test following his release of An Inconvenient Truth. Whilst 
neither of these events was created by animal rights activists, they were opportunistically and 
cumulatively used to further their agenda. 
As animal rights activists are yet to prove successful in their aims, in that the use of 
animals as a means for human ends remains widespread throughout a great many parts of the 
world, we do not suggest that the work of aligning common worlds is easy, or some sort of 
radical panacea. Nevertheless, our writing of radical social change as being opportunistic and 
cumulative is supported by institutional theorists who dialectically propose that radical actors 
need to make the most of normative and material contradictions as and when they arise (e.g., 
Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002). Additionally, our showing that animal rights activists 
can be understood as working on, or as working within, multiple common worlds 
simultaneously, empirically echoes more conceptual work in moral philosophy: which 
suggests that (radical) social change will need to be legitimated within multiple justificatory 
(Habermas, 1990: Chapter 1) or ethical (Nickel, 2007) spheres or traditions if it is to prove 
robust and sustainable. 
Pluralism and Radical Social Change 
A recent critique of French pragmatism suggests it is limited to perceiving values as a tool for 
justification, and not as a motivating factor (Thornton et al., 2012: 9). Whilst there is some 
sense to this critique, our case suggests it is ultimately misdirected. In particular, it seems 
difficult to deny that the various arguments that animal rights activists make regarding the 
moral equality of humans and (many) other animals, and that are broadly associated with the 
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civic common world, motivate their daily existence. The decision of philosophers such as 
Regan (2004) and Singer (1995) to avoid consuming meat for example, seem fairly obviously 
motivated by tests of equality and solidarity, by notions of rules and rights, and so on. More 
generally, we note that, as motivations are consciously justified in many instances, the 
distinction that Thornton et al., (2012: 9) wish to make between motivation and justification 
is easily strained (cf., Vaisey, 2009). 
More importantly, the case has shown how a plurality of economies of worth and common 
worlds can be mobilized by radical activists whose ultimate aim is to make currently 
marginal moral positions or normative values mainstream. As noted throughout the paper, the 
notion of aligning common worlds, rather than relating them in conflict or compromise, has 
hitherto been overlooked by French pragmatist writings. It has also been ignored by writings 
on organization and radical change more generally, which have tended to emphasize that 
radical activists mobilize one set of values against another when seeking to replace, rather 
than reform, a given status quo (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Whelan, 2013). Similarly, the 
general idea of alignment has not received a great deal of attention in works informed by the 
institutional logics tradition: for it also tends to emphasize that diverse logics can be related 
in terms of replacement and conflict, blending and compromise, or separation and segregation 
(e.g., Thornton et al., 2012: Chapter 7). 
A major reason for this is that all these literatures tend to analytically focus on specific 
sectors, or fields, of society. The ultimate aim of radical activists as we have conceived them, 
however, is not to change one part of society, but to change society in full. In particular, we 
note that animal rights activists and organizations want governments and businesses, (other) 
activists and non-government organizations, schools, families, citizens, church-goers, 
consumers and so on – i.e., individuals and collectives more generally – to all agree to the 
import of respecting animal rights, and of refraining from treating animals as simple means. 
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Clearly, the conception of radical change we are advancing is much broader, and much 
more ‘social’, than the conceptions one finds amongst leading works in institutional theory. 
Thus, and whereas institutional theorists suggest that changing combinations and roles of 
accounting and legal firms can be considered radical (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings 1996), we 
suggest they are better conceived as relatively narrow (field level) and shallow (superficial): 
for they do not upset core distinctions that structure society-wide phenomenal existence.  
Nevertheless, recent work that draws on institutional theory, and that relates to the 
Holocaust (Martí and Fernández, 2013), has explored changes that we would consider 
radical: for the changes explored in this work relate to fundamental ontological distinctions 
(e.g., who is, and is not, human) that underpin a huge range of social policies and practices. 
Although French pragmatists would likely suggest that the tragic actuality of the holocaust, 
and the more progressive possibility of animal rights, illustrates the “uncertainty that 
threatens social arrangements and hence the fragility of reality” (Boltanski, 2011: 54), we 
suggest that such extreme examples point more towards the relative robustness of many 
social norms and practices. In particular, we emphasize that, despite the best efforts of animal 
rights activists, the eating of meat remains well entrenched. 
In addition to benefitting from revisiting the likes of Bourdieu (e.g., 1977), then, who is 
often presented as their bête noir, our work suggests that French pragmatists would benefit 
from increased engagement with the likes of Descola (2013a, b). Just as we have done in the 
present work, Descola’s work points to the importance of ontological distinctions that, in 
many ways, come before the economies of worth that have hitherto interested French 
pragmatists (cf., Boltanski, 2013). Most Western people, for instance, simply presume that all 
animals are in an ontologically separate category to all humans, and only think of using a 
common world’s values to justify such an ontological distinction when engaged in a conflict 
there over. As a result, it seems that if we are to understand why such distinctions exist, then 
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it might be helpful to supplement, or look beyond, the economies of worth framework. Whilst 
other perspectives by which to generate understanding of ontological distinctions exist (e.g., 
Cumpsty, 1991), we think that Descola’s work could prove particularly helpful. 
Limitations 
Given our relatively broad conceptual purposes, this essay is necessarily limited in a number 
of regards. In the first instance, the paper is propositionally limited. Thus, and whilst we do 
suggest that radical social change will be significantly enabled by the alignment of an 
increasing number of social worlds, we do not suggest when, if ever, such alignment will 
reach a ‘tipping point’, and actually result in the change desired. Similarly, we do not explain 
whether or not conflict or compromise could ever prove sufficient for radical change. 
Our general concern to conceive alignment has also resulted in us not paying full and clear 
attention to the micro-means by which this might be achieved. Perhaps most notably, we have 
not been able to fully engage with the science and technology studies literature’s focus on the 
practical and pragmatic considerations that shape the generation, gathering and presenting of 
evidence (e.g., Swiestra & Rip, 2007), or provide a detailed examination of the ways in which 
PETA construct ‘tests of worth’. 
Furthermore, we note that the paper is limited in that it does not seek to critically appraise 
the various normative arguments associated with animal rights, and due to its focusing on 
PETA. As Peta was founded in the US (by the British born Ingrid Newkirk), and as PETA 
has a distinct reputation for controversy, we recognize that our findings are shaped by 
cultural and organizational specifics that arguably encourage us to emphasize the importance 
of controversy and debate. A related limitation is that we have not sought to identify whether 
or not the mainstream of donors to animal rights organizations like PETA would agree with 
the alignment activities that we propose they are engaging in, or whether they would be 
deemed consistent with their identity (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). 
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Whilst the preceding limitations relate to the conceptual aims of our paper being relatively 
broad, another set of limitations emerge when our conceptual aims are viewed as not broad 
enough. Most obviously, in primarily building upon French pragmatism, we have been 
constrained by this literature’s explicit focus on common worlds and economies of worth of 
Western origin. When this constraint is relaxed, it becomes clear that the sort of radical 
change that animal rights activists seek can also be brought about from within, or the aid of, 
other ontological traditions (e.g., Descola, 2013a, b). Buddhist thought, for example, which 
aims at the realization of ‘no-self’ through the eradication of desire,  and which is difficult, 
but arguably not impossible, to conceive with Western conceptual tools (Whelan, 2012), 
suggests that our use of animals as means gets in the way of this (non-)objective. Suffice it to 
note that it is not clear how French pragmatists can easily accommodate such a foreign point 
of view given that all eight of the common worlds appear founded on a strong notion of 
individual selves. Whilst other non-Western originating ways of thought present similar 
challenges, these challenges will often prove less extreme. Confucianism, for example, can be 
equated with the domestic common world outlined by French pragmatism (Whelan, 2007). 
Future Research 
Given the paper’s substantive focus, we obviously think that management and organizational 
scholarship will benefit from an increased focus on the hitherto largely neglected relationship 
of animals and humans. More theoretically, and as the paper’s contributions and limitations 
combine to suggest, we believe that the idea of alignment work opens up various lines of 
research. Four in particular stand out. 
First, historical work that investigates the role of alignment, and conflict and compromise, 
in prior radical transformations is clearly warranted. For example, what, if any, similarities, 
link the justificatory work efforts of abolititionists and suffragists? Did they predominantly 
employ conflict, compromise, or alignment? Did they use these different common world 
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relations at different points in time? Efforts at providing answers to such questions, we 
propose, can significantly advance our understanding of radical social change, and the role of 
organizations and activists therein. 
Second, more explicitly normative work into the benefits of conflict, compromise, and 
alignment, also seems in need of attention. Although work in business ethics and corporate 
social responsibility has recently touched on such issues (Whelan, 2013), these literatures 
remain more or less isolated from discussions in French pragmatism. Accordingly, future 
work that increasingly links these literatures will likely prove of benefit. 
Third, and more specifically, descriptive research is needed with regard to the ways in 
which radical activists use ‘tests of worth’ to align common worlds, or to create conflict or 
compromise between them. Amongst other schools of thought that could be drawn upon, we 
suggest that work in Actor-Network Theory (e.g., Latour, 2004) can increasingly be 
integrated with work in French pragmatism (Guggenheim and Potthast, 2012) to shed light on 
such concerns. 
And finally, we note that, although our approach can help unpack the content of the 
‘orders of worth’ and ‘tests’ mobilized to trigger radical change through alignment, it does 
not fully account for the broader processes within which these ‘orders of worth’ and ‘tests’ 
are actually engaged.  Social movement scholars, on the other hand, have developed 
processual analyses and suggested that ‘framing’ is central to the success of social 
movements (Benford and Snow, 2000). Nevertheless, they have rarely documented the moral 
and normative ‘force’ of framing (Ansari and Reinecke, 2015).  Accordingly, we propose that 
future research could cross-fertilize our analysis of alignment inspired by French Pragmatist 
Sociology with social movement concepts to develop a processual approach accounting for 
the role of alignment processes work within the context of social movements. 
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Table 1 – Four Types of Common World Relations 
 
 
  
Relations Descriptors
Common World Conflicts are characterized by antagonism 
between two or more common worlds. For example, the 
'inspired world' of art can conflict with the 'market world' due to 
the latter's "subjection to money" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 
239), and the obscuring of creative inspiration associated with 
being a 'sell out'.
confront, tension, resistance , different 
nature, foreign, disagreement, clash, 
denunciation (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 216-
217, 223-225). 
Common World Composite Setups are characterized by a 
mismatch between  common worlds. A "machine operator" 
offering a gift to an "expert" that has come to analyse the 
machine the operator works on, provides a clear illustration of 
an 'ugly' combination of the 'industrial world' and the 'domestic 
world' (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 239).
monstrous, awkward, anxiety, disparate, 
incongruous, troubling, strange (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006: 216-217, 225-227, 277). 
Common World Compromises seek to avoid conflicts between 
common worlds by refusing to privilege one common world over 
another, and by agreeing to negotiate some sort of fragile 
agreement  between them. Compromises between the 
'domestic world' and 'market world' are commonplace. For 
example, a bank employee is likely to suggest to 'clients/friends' 
that "a faithful friend is a solvent client"  (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006: 278). 'Clients/friends', on the other hand, might respond 
that a a good friend 'pulls strings' to overcome any such 
concerns.
come to terms, suspend a clash without 
settling it, equivalence, ambiguous, general 
interest, common good, work out, stabilize, 
build bridges (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 277-
281). 
Common World Allignments are characterized by unforced 
unanimity  between common worlds; by harmonious agreement 
between common worlds in their own terms. A good example of 
such alignment is when a work produced entirely within the 
'inspired world' (e.g., an album relased by a hitherto 
underground musician) or 'industrial world' (e.g., an electric car  
produced by a devoted and single-minded engineer) 
subsequently proves to be very, very profitable (and thus 
consistent with the 'market world').
overdetermined justification, common world 
agreement, plural consensus.
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Figure 1 –Pamela Anderson: PETA’s use of Famous Women 
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Figure 2 – The Stratified Alignment of the Industrial World 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – ‘Calling Out’ Al Gore: A Situational-Opportunity 
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